Anti-FPV behaviour is today part of base infantry discipline on the line. It is not specialist technique but principles applied every minute on the front: movement, dispersion, cover, friendly-jamming awareness. This chapter is purely defensive — it does NOT describe FPV employment or offensive procedures.
The five anti-FPV principles
There is no absolute counter-measure to an FPV. There is a system of principles which, applied with constant discipline, dramatically reduce the probability of being hit.
| Principle | Application |
|---|---|
| Awareness | Continuous listening, sky scanning, recognition of RF / team signals |
| Dispersion | Never bunched, never aligned, distance ≥ 10 m without cover |
| Overhead cover | Always seek overhead protection: trees, buildings, galleries, nets |
| Movement | Brief halts, non-linear routes, never same point twice |
| Jamming awareness | Know effects of friendly jammer, relative position, useful distances |
Awareness — listen and scan
The first defence layer is early detection. An FPV picked up at 200 m gives 5-10 seconds to act; detected at 50 m, 1-2 seconds.
- One team member at halt dedicated to listening/scanning sky 360°
- Tactical RF detectors (e.g. Bulat class) where available — audio/vibration alarm on FPV-band emissions
- Comms: immediate "DRONE" or "FPV" callout on intra-team radio, brief, single word
- Passive reception: monitor higher net for warnings from forward OPs
- Acoustic recognition: difference between Mavic (steady low whine), FPV racing (sharp erratic), night bomber (heavy slow rumble)
- Sight: scan for moving black dots against sky, fast shadows on ground
Dispersion — do not be a cluster
An FPV with fragmentation charge has a lethal radius of 5-10 m, with HEAT 1-3 m. Dispersion turns a casualty into an isolated case, not a lost squad.
- In open: minimum 10-15 m between moving elements
- Halted in open: 20-30 m, never aligned on road or trail
- Vehicles: dismount and disperse immediately on halt, do not linger on vehicle
- Halts: choose positions allowing natural dispersion (separate trees, broken walls)
- Avoid bottlenecks: forced passages (bridges, junctions) crossed one by one with interval
- Pre-attack visual comm: if the drone is already spotted, indicate opposite evasion direction
The worst 2024-2026 AARs document FPVs hitting tight groups of 4-8 people. One hit = multiple casualties. 10 m dispersion is enough to save most.
Overhead cover — use the terrain
The FPV comes from above, but its attack trajectory is lateral-descending. Overhead cover, even partial, forces the pilot to manoeuvre in 3D, reducing accuracy and giving him less time.
- Dense trees: FPV must fly low to target, losing speed and visibility
- Buildings / structures: block direct approach from sky
- Galleries and covered trenches: near-total shelter if accessed quickly
- Anti-drone nets: mechanical barrier, premature charge detonation
- Trucks / carriers with casing: protective cage intercepts charge before vehicle
- Under vehicle: temporary shelter if FPV has not already fixed vehicle as target
An FPV can penetrate thin foliage or drop through gaps. Effective overhead cover has physical mass (thick wood, masonry, earth, metal).
Movement — time discipline
- Minimum halt: every visible stop is opportunity for the FPV pilot
- Short sprints between cover, length < 30 m, never continuously linear
- Route variation: change path every transit, avoid "death trails"
- Hours: dawn and dusk are intensified FPV-flight hours — prefer transit in unfavourable weather or deep night
- March speed: balance speed (short exposure) and silence (acoustic/breathing)
- Approach to covered position: last 50 m most dangerous — sprint, not walk
Friendly jamming — living with the EM bubble
The friendly jammer (trench or team-carried) is the first active defence. But it has side effects on own comms and precise limits that must be known.
- Range: team jammer 50-200 m, trench jammer 200-500 m, larger vehicle systems
- Covered bands: 2.4 GHz, 5.8 GHz, 900 MHz typically — not always all simultaneously
- Side effect: degrades own comms if in same bands
- Limits: fiber-optic FPV is immune; ELRS-link FPV partially resilient
- Position: stay inside team jammer bubble during movement; aware of distance
- Discipline: jammer on does not replace dispersion and cover — it is an additional layer
What NOT to do
- Shoot at incoming FPV without specific training — distracts and rarely works
- Stand to identify the drone (common fatal reflex)
- Bunch around a hit teammate — second FPV waits for exactly that
- Film incoming drone with phone (documented in casualty AARs)
- Rely only on jammer without physical dispersion
- Continue same route after first FPV — second already knows the direction
- Halt in open space for non-urgent radio call
Common mistakes
- Trusting personal reaction speed ("I'll dodge it" — you won't)
- Ignoring distant buzzing as "far away"
- Thinking own jammer is on when actually flat or off
- Underestimating fiber-optic drones as "rare" (expanding 2025-2026)
- Resting in comfortable but exposed position ("we're in the rear")
- Casualty transport without planning overhead protection along route
Lessons learned Ukraine
Among the publicly discussed 2024-2026 front statistics, a large percentage of infantry losses on active sectors is attributed to FPVs. The Ukrainian doctrinal response has been integration of anti-FPV behaviour at base training level, before any specialist track. Brigades that introduced constant scanning routine, fixed 10-15 m dispersion, team jammers and halt discipline reduced significantly losses documented in OSINT. The operational message is univocal: anti-FPV behaviour is no longer a specialisation, it is the new baseline of the modern soldier. A soldier who does not operate that way is a future statistic.