Electronic warfare (EW) is now a constant dimension of the Ukrainian battlefield — not an event but an environmental state. This chapter describes doctrine, the practical effects on a soldier's equipment, and how to recognise them. It does NOT contain jamming, intercept or offensive employment procedures.
EW doctrine: ESM, ECM, ECCM
NATO doctrine divides electronic warfare into three functions. Understanding them is prerequisite to reading your operational environment.
| Function | Description (doctrinal level) |
|---|---|
| ESM (Electronic Support Measures) | Passive listening — intercept, classification, geolocation of enemy emissions |
| ECM (Electronic Countermeasures) | Active — jamming, spoofing, link neutralisation |
| ECCM (Electronic Counter-Countermeasures) | Protection — frequency hopping, burst transmission, directional antennas, spread spectrum |
Every soldier in a saturated EW zone suffers enemy ECM and depends on their own ECCM. Knowing which category you face helps read the situation.
Known Russian EW systems (OSINT)
Russian EW systems are publicly documented. Awareness of their existence and approximate range is part of soldier culture.
| System | Function |
|---|---|
| Shipovnik-Aero | Tactical anti-UAV EW, vehicle-mounted, tens of km |
| Murmansk-BN | Strategic HF EW, hundreds/thousands of km, long-range comms intercept |
| Borisoglebsk-2 | Multi-band ground system, tactical comms intercept and jamming |
| Krasukha-2 / Krasukha-4 | Anti-radar, anti-AWACS, high power |
| Pole-21 / Pole-21M | Area anti-GPS, GNSS denial over wide zones |
| Leer-3 | EW combined with Orlan-10 drone, tactical GSM cellular intercept |
Knowing the names does not mean countering them. It means understanding your EW experience is not random but systemic.
Recognisable EW effects on the soldier
EW is not invisible: it shows up in specific ways on individual gear. Catching the symptoms early means changing behaviour before the problem becomes tactical.
- Radio: constant in-band noise floor, loss of reception on normally clear frequencies, distorted voice
- GPS: jumping position, constant drift of hundreds of metres, total loss of fix
- Smartphone: cellular 0 bars despite friendly towers, unstable GPS
- Friendly drone datalink: pixelating video, control loss, fail-safe RTH (return-to-home) triggered
- Countermeasure systems: detectors firing continuous alarms with no identified source
- Electronic compass: drift or sudden flip (intentional or natural interference)
Special case: GPS shows a plausible but false position. More dangerous than jamming because it triggers no alarm. Verify with magnetic compass and terrain references.
Friendly EW effects
Friendly EW protects your units — but can also degrade your own systems. Awareness of friendly jamming avoids interpreting a defensive effect as enemy attack.
- Team-carried anti-FPV jammers: also degrade friendly radios on overlapping bands
- Trench jammers (omnidirectional): create local EM-silence "bubbles"
- Vehicle jammers: protection on the move, but the vehicle itself is an identifiable emitter
- Strategic friendly EW: may not be communicated in detail for OPSEC — accept the degradation
Defensive behaviour in EW environment
- Always expect EW — do not be surprised when it arrives
- Have a PACE plan (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) for every comms means
- Maintain traditional navigation (map, magnetic compass) as GPS fallback
- Know fallback frequencies and physical rendezvous points
- Limit own emissions: less you transmit, less you give enemy SIGINT
- Recognise symptoms early and call them on net ("EW ACTIVE" as callout)
- Do not assume the radio works — test with brief checks at op start
EW and drones
The relationship between EW and drones is currently the main doctrinal balance point of the front. Understanding it at principle level is part of the modern soldier's kit.
- 5.8 GHz FPV: vulnerable to commercial jamming, jammer radius 100-500 m
- ELRS or encrypted-link FPV: more resilient, require dedicated EW
- Fiber-optic drones: immune to EW (physical cable) — emerged 2024, expanding 2025-2026
- Commercial Mavic / Autel: GPS-dependent — vulnerable to GPS denial
- Loitering munitions (Shahed, Lancet): inertial nav + GPS, partially resilient
Fiber-optic drones have reduced classic EW effectiveness. The response is hybrid: hard-kill + residual EW + physical dispersion. The soldier must assume some FPVs will get through.
Common mistakes
- Trusting GPS without compass/map fallback
- Interpreting interference as a fault of one's own device
- Raising transmission power to "punch through" jamming — exposes more to DF
- No documented PACE plan at team level
- Ignoring an EW detector because "it always rings" — the day it changes matters
- Believing encryption = invisibility (encryption protects content, not emission)
Lessons learned Ukraine
The Ukrainian front is the densest EW environment in modern operational history. Publicly, systems such as Shipovnik-Aero, Murmansk-BN, Borisoglebsk-2 and Krasukha are in rotational employment along the entire line. Tactically, every forward team lives with unstable GPS, degraded radios, dependency on fiber-optic links and drone killers. The shared experience: tactical victory does not go to the most technologically advanced units, but to those who have integrated degradation as a normal state and trained to operate in it. The topographic map and magnetic compass have gone from relic to survival equipment.